CANE
SUGAR
TRUST
CO. LTD
INFORMATION
(Copied from and issued by the Sugar
Info Centre, London)
Sugar Frauds
Warning by International Chamber of Commerce
On 25th July 1991, a Bulgarian buyer paid US$3.8 million for
13,100 tonnes of Brazilian sugar by letter of credit. The payment was released
by international banks on the basis of the usual documents which proved
that the sugar was loaded on 17th July in the port of Santos on the m.v.
Giovanna bound for Varna, Bulgaria.
Neither the ship nor the sugar existed and the criminals have
never been brought to justice.
In August 1992 a Paris bank released US$2.89 million under a
letter of credit on the basis of documents stating that 10,000 tonnes of
white refined sugar had been loaded on the m.v. Vladimir Ilyich in Panama,
bound for Kalingrad, Russia.
The documents were forgeries and the money has never been recovered.
Introduction
There is nothing peculiar about sugar which lends itself to fraud:
it is simply one of many commodities and trades which are used in similar
fraudulent routines. Recent developments in international markets have
increased the vulnerability of the sugar trade, thus raising the profile
of frauds. These developments include:
-
the general liberalization of the international trade in sugar
-
reduced supervision of payments as a consequence of reductions in currency
and foreign exchange controls
-
the explosive growth in the number of independent nations (e.g. the former
USSR), creating numerous new trade routes, international banks, currencies
and governments. These are frequently characterised by inexperienced management
and inadequate regulation. When the exotic is commonplace, criminals are
less visible.
-
the advance in communications which enables criminals to operate by remote
control and construct a web of fraud transcending boundaries with ease.
Frauds almost always have the general character of legitimate transactions
of exchange, but with the crucial difference that while the honest party
provides genuine value the fraudster provides little or none.
All frauds require the same basic ingredients. There must be substance
or pretext to entice the victim, whether it be counterfeit goods, or forged
documents proving title. There must also be a victim. Occasionally, the
victim may be the market as a whole (e.g. the debasement of currencies
by a government printing paper notes), but more usually the victim is an
individual or business entity. The fraudster then needs a mechanism to
obtain something of value in return for his fraudulent exchange. Finally,
he needs to evade arrest for his crime.
Creating the Substance
Diamonds can be faked and old master paintings can be forged, but
commodities are easily measured and tested and are rarely of sufficient
value to attract forgers. With sugar, the fraudulent transaction is almost
invariably based on a consignment which does not physically exist. Although
surprising at first glance, this potential arises because bureaucracies
everywhere have engendered a belief in the authority of paperwork. Just
as worthless paper money is accepted as having value, so pieces of paper
are accepted as having value, so pieces of paper are accepted as proof
that a consignment of sugar exists. The ordinary man does not go to his
central bank to check his wealth in gold - he relies on a statement of
account on a bit of paper. By the same token, sugar documentation is taken
on trust. It is only necessary to forge documents showing the existence
of a consignment and to find someone to buy it.
Finding the Victim
Victims of fraud are almost always attracted by expectations of
exceptional profit. They succumb more to their own greed than anything
else. A deal which is too good to be true probably isn't true - yet people
around the world queue up every day for all manner of schemes which could
not logically be genuine.
Sugar is openly traded on all the world's major commodity exchanges
and its price is exactly established. There are several long-standing international
sugar traders of the highest repute. Offers to sell sugar at less than
the ruling market price makes no commercial sense - unless the real motive
is fraud.
This has been a standard ploy since time immemorial: to make the
victim believe that he has access to a phenomenal deal; so good that he
wants to keep it secret. this enables the fraudulent seller to conceal
detailed information about the origins and location of the sugar. The buyer
thinks he is on to something no-one else knows about, which will make him
a quick profit, and doesn't care too much about the origins of the sugar
or why it is cheap, so long as it is genuine - and the documents appear
to protect him on this point.
To allay suspicions a fraudulent seller will often offer various
assurances which seem to give protection, or at least to vindicate his
character. He may lodge a performance bond equal to, say. 2% of the value.
He is then risking 2% in the hands of an honest buyer in order to swindle
him of the remaining 98%. He may provide various attestations from banks
as to his financial worth (of no legal value or protection). He may offer
to supply secret information about the exact location and origins of the
sugar in return for, say, 10% part payment, either as a means of consolidating
the deal or simply to abscond with the part payment. Provision of unnecessary
quasi-official documentation is another tactic; any bit of paper which
seems to confirm the existence of the sugar provides further re-assurance.
Extracting Payment
Victims are usually surprised and even outraged when they discover that
the international banking system provided absolutely no protection against
payments made on the basis of fraudulent documents. They fail to understand
the rules of international payments systems and the division of responsibility
between themselves and the banking system.
The common sugar fraud utilises the normal international trading practice
of payment via irrevocable letter of credit. The buyer first arranges for
his bank to issue a letter of credit. This is a legal undertaking by the
bank, not the buyer, to make payment when certain specified documentation
is provided which "proves" the sugar exists and is in transit to the buyer
or at some agreed location - documents the fraudster of course intends
to forge. Note that it is the bank which gives the undertaking, albeit
at the buyer's expense. The letter of credit is also irrevocable - so the
buyer is now entirely in the hands of his bank and the seller. Any alteration
to the terms of a letter of credit must be agreed by both parties, so the
buyer is powerless even if he becomes suspicious. The crucial point is
that banks deal solely in documents, not sugar. They are protected by international
banking rules (the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits)
which stipulate that a bank must honour a letter of credit if the specified
documents are presented and are correct on their face. They have neither
obligation nor incentive to question the documents; only that they apparently
accord with those specified and there is nothing which suggests forgery.
In point of fact banks have more incentive to detect forged currency notes
or cheques, where they stand the loss themselves.
It is up to the buyer to make independent checks. For example, in the
case of the US$3.8 Million fraud described opposite, it would have been
simple to establish with Lloyds Register of Shipping that the m.v. Giovanna
was nowhere near the Brazilian port of Santos in July 1991. It had been
renamed the m.v. Styliani in 1983 and broken up for scrap in Pakistan in
1984.
Prevention
The conduct of sugar frauds suggests elementary extra prudence
regarding:
-
Sugar offered below market price.
-
Undisclosed details of the seller or origin or any air of secrecy.
-
Performance bonds or deposits.
-
Involvement in countries previously targeted e.g. buyers in India, China,
Hong Kong, the Middle East or Eastern Europe and sugar sourced from Latin
America, the Philippines or Thailand.
-
Independently checking any ship, its location, and its cargo.
-
Any unusual specification of the sugar or documenation.
Further Action
The best long-term defence is to ensure that fraudulent stories are well-publicised.
Any information should be given to the International Chamber of Commerce,
which has taken the initiative in gathering intelligence and advising those
at risk.
SEE ALSO:
SLC and PBG
frauds - High Yield Programmes !
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Sugar Traders and Shippers
U.K. OFFICE
TEL: +44 1877 331581; FAX +44
1877 331581
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Last Updated 14th April 1998 20.15 GMT
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